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ABSTRACT: Ethical Mutual Funds (emf) stand out for their investments in companies that develop 
strategies based on Corporate Social Responsibility (csr) through good practices of Corporate Go-
vernance (cg). The aim of this paper is to analyze the types of companies that make up the portfolio 
of Spanish emf, taking into account their cg model, their organizational structure and their econo-
mic and financial aspects. The results obtained show that the Spanish emf prefer companies that 
promote the participation of stakeholders in their organizational structure and accessibility to their 
information. Additional evidence shows that the development of good cg practices in the context of 
csr favors access to financing provided by financial markets and, within them, the emf.
KEYWORDS: Ethical Mutual Funds, Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, Organi-
zational Structure, accessibility and performance.
Introduction
Over the last few years the economic literature has used the term “Socially 
Responsible Investment” (sri). Among the financial products linked to the 
sri1, we have the Ethical Mutual Funds (emf). An emf offers to its inves-
tors a portfolio of stocks and investments which, in addition to generating 
* This paper originated from the Training Program for University Professoriate fpu 
13/02481, financed by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports of the Govern-
ment of Spain.
1 Socially Responsible Investment includes a wide range of different financial products, 
comprising socially responsible and ethical pension plans, social sovereign bonds and 
some share certificates, among others. One of the most common products is ethical 
funds. These funds commit to placing their assets in companies which stand for social 
justice, fairness and sustainability in the use of resources (Karlsson, 2006).
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RESuMEn: los fondos de inversión éticos se destacan por realizar inver-
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formación. Evidencia complementaria señala que el desarrollo de buenas 
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financial results equal to those of the market, assures its 
participants their savings go to socially responsible compa-
nies (Aslaksen & Synnestvedt, 2003; Camino, 1993; Gar-
cía-de-Maradiaga & Valor, 2006, 2007; Sparkes & Cowton, 
2004; Valor et al., 2009). The main characteristic of an emf 
is the use of non-financial criteria in the selection of social-
ly responsible companies for its portfolio (Renneboog et al., 
2008; Signori, 2009), where a key aspect for a company 
to be considered as socially responsible is the development 
of good cg practices (Kolk & Pinkse, 2010). Thus, csr and, 
within it, cg represent essential criteria for emf in their se-
lection of investees (Capelle-Blancard & Monjon, 2012; Mu-
ñoz-Torres, Fernández-Izquierdo & Balaguer-Franch, 2004; 
Perera & Cortés 2006).
The aim of this paper is to study the type of company that 
Spanish emf perceive as socially responsible. Therefore, in this 
study, we identify the qualities of the companies that Spanish 
emf prefer when making up their portfolio. These qualities are 
verified by the information published by these companies on 
their cg model, their organizational structure and their eco-
nomic and financial efficiency. In the design of the portfolio 
managers of emf often use databases or ethical indexes (djsi, 
ftse4 Good Index and Domini Social Index, among others). 
These ethical indexes filter the companies following the ar-
bitrary criteria of the creating agency (Székely & Knirsch, 
2005). Given the limitations of socially responsible indexes, 
public information could be an alternative in the selection 
of companies for an emf’s portfolio. To achieve this, we have 
used cluster analysis and two regression models.
Currently, there are fifteen registered and marketed emf in 
Spain. In 2012, the average rate of return was of 0.16%, 
with total assets valued at 132,968,000 euros; which, ac-
cording to eurosif (2012), means Spain is one of Europe’s 
fastest growing markets in the future, thus justifying the 
location of this study. Our results show there is a significant 
relationship between cg practices involving stakeholders 
and the preferences of emf. As its main contribution, this 
paper shows the role of financial results as a key aspect for 
an organizational structure and cg model.
This paper is made up by five sections. The first section is in-
troductory. The second reviews the research carried out in 
this field and of the various hypotheses studied in this paper. 
The third section introduces data, variables, descriptive sta-
tistics and results to corroborate the proposed hypotheses. 
In the fourth section we discuss the results. The last section 
provides conclusions based on the results obtained.
Background and hypotheses
emf’s investee companies are an example of the relation-
ship between csr and cg (Camino, 1993; Lizcano, 2006). 
Nowadays, one cannot conceive of a company qualified as 
socially responsible that does not have a good cg. The con-
cept of cg has changed since Fama and Jensen (1983) to 
our days. In the last few years, cg has been defined as the 
complex set of restraints that shape the ex-post bargaining 
over the quasi-rents generated by a firm (Zingales, 1998); 
quasi-rents that are taken into consideration by different 
stakeholders (Armstrong, Guay & Weber, 2010; Suárez-Ti-
rado, 2007; Fan, 2013). This would be the concept of cg 
from the point of view of the stakeholder theory (Jamali, 
2008). Therefore, cg has now become a key tool in estab-
lishing csr strategies with the participation of stakeholders.
This participation varies in intensity and impact on the 
management model. So, based on the cg model, the stake-
holders’ participation can be understood as an element of 
legal accountability, where stakeholders develop a pas-
sive behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). However, the role of stakeholders in projects and 
groups in an organization could also show an active be-
havior that enables the collaboration and integration of 
their real needs (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Di Domenico, 
Haugh & Tracey, 2010). In that sense, the participation of 
stakeholders could be as much an institutional mandate 
as a strategic tool of the organization. Consequently, the 
accessibility to information will depend on the intensity of 
the participation that is determined by the csr strategy.
Generally speaking, companies adopt different csr strat-
egies depending on the cg system applied. The latter is 
conditioned by cultural aspects, market development and 
legal regulations of the country in which the company op-
erates, as well as by the influence and concentration of 
foreign capital on its shareholders (Cuervo, 2002; Weimer 
& Pape, 1999). Despite this, some authors hold that there 
is a single model of cg at international level, where the 
specific aspects of the Anglosphere dominate (Belloc & Pa-
gano 2013; Bozec & Día, 2012; Gilson, 2001; Hansmann & 
Kraakman 2001; Khanna, Kogan & Palepu, 2006). Against 
this trend, other authors maintain that the single cg model 
does not exist in practice, given the idiosyncrasies among 
different countries and societies (La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998; Lubatkin et al., 2007; Reaz & Hossain, 2007). 
Along these lines, we find research that only distinguishes 
between the Anglo-Saxon model and the continental one 
(Chan & Cheung, 2012; De Andrés & Vallelado, 2008; Gar-
cía-Castro et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Roe, 
1993; Sarkar, 2011). However, this categorization is not con-
sidered exhaustive, and others extend the proposal of cg 
models. In particular, some authors conclude in their studies 
that the continental model actually conceals two categories, 
the German model and the French one (Blazy et al., 2012; 
Briano, 2012; Ewmi, 2005; Gourevitch, 2003; Licht, Gold-
schmith & Schwartz, 2005; Tröger, 2005). 
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In other studies, the existence of the Japanese cg model as 
an alternative in the Asian region is detected; some authors 
associate this model with characteristics of the Anglo-Sax-
on and French models (Briano, 2012; Yoshikawa, 2007). In 
this respect, Young et al. (2008), Chung and Luo (2008) 
and Peters, Miller and Kusyk (2011) detected the existence 
of a cg model that is typical of emerging countries (such 
as Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico), defined 
with German and French influences. Finally, another trend 
was identified as a hybrid of the Anglo-Saxon and German 
model, which is used in the Scandinavian countries (Briano, 
2012; De Andrés & Santamaría, 2010). 
The differences between these six models are analyzed 
in figure 1. As we can observe, the Anglo-Saxon model is 
characterized by a Common Law legal system against the 
Civil Law system of the other models. In relation to the 
stakeholders’ participation, it is possible to observe differ-
ent behaviors. Anglo-Saxon model has a low level of par-
ticipation, while the highest level is found in the German 
model. This degree of participation is directly related to the 
equity concentration and the minority investor protection. 
In the Anglo-Saxon model we detect low concentration and 
high protection to the minority investor; while in the French 
model we can identify the opposite behavior. Finally, and 
like a tangential aspect, orientation is different, since the 
Anglo-Saxon model is characterized by a market orienta-
tion, while the models closer to the Continental model take 
into account aspects related to the internal organization 
of the entity (management orientation). Moreover, we can 
observe that the Scandinavian model, the Emergent mod-
el and the Japanese model are a mixture of the previous 
characteristics. All these characteristics impact the level of 
performance achieved by the organization (La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998). 
In addition, several authors have studied which condi-
tional factors –external and internal– influence a compa-
ny’s choice for a cg model. Among the external factors, 
the following have been identified as influential: the legal 
tradition (De Andrés & Santamaría, 2010), the supervisory 
authority of the stock market in which the company par-
ticipates (Pucko, 2005) and the stock market liquidity in 
which the company is listed (Briano, 2012). Among the 
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internal factors, we find: the management model of the or-
ganization and its market orientation (Briano, 2012; Pucko, 
2005; Reaz & Hossain, 2007).
To this day, there are no studies on the type of cg model 
applied by investee companies or the factors associated 
with this choice. This study is an opportunity to take into 
account, in addition to the internal and external factors 
proposed by other authors, economic and financial results 
and corporate structure as determinants in choosing a cg 
model in the context of emf. Consequently, our first two 
working hypotheses are:
h1: The emf’s investee companies use different cg models.
h2: The financial results and corporate structure are factors 
that affect the choice of cg model in investee companies.
Previously and in a general framework, different papers ha- 
ve studied the relationship between corporate structure 
and the cg model implemented by the organization. La 
Porta et al. (1998) and, more recently, López and Liduina 
(2006), conclude by stating the existence of a unidirection-
al causality in which the cg model determines the corporate 
structure of the organization. However, other authors, such 
as Coffee (2000) and Johnson et al. (2000), indicate the ex-
istence of an inverse relationship; that is, cg models are the 
result of the various forms of organization adopted by firms. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to contrast these claims, 
but, given the duality of opinions, we assume that the fac-
tors that affect the choice for a cg model should also affect 
the shaping of a company’s corporate structure. In particu-
lar, the economic and financial results could be a determin-
ing factor, which leads to the third hypothesis:
h3: Economic and financial results and the cg model 
chosen are the factors that determine the degree of devel-
opment of the corporate structure of investee companies.
Methodology
In this paper, we have used data from transverse cuts of 
biannual public reports from 2012 deposited by the emf at 
the National Stock Market Commission (Comisión Nacional 
de Mercado de Valores – cnmv, in Spanish). Currently, there 
are 15 emf on the Spanish market. There is no public data 
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Figure 1. Main characteristics of cg models. Source: Own elaboration.
j o u r n a l
r e v i s t a
innovar
143rev.  innovar vol.  27,  núm. 65,  JUlio-SePTiemBre Del 2017
found for other Collective Investment Institutions (cii), prob-
ably due to restrictions imposed by commercial regulations. 
Andreu-Sánchez, Ortiz-Lázaro and Sarto-Marzal (2010) 
suggest analyzing the composition of the portfolio versus 
the aggregate figures when studying the investment policy 
of a mutual fund. The portfolio of Spanish emf is made 
up of different assets. Mostly, these assets are invested in 
fixed income (57%), although the percentage invested in 
variable income (43%) is not insignificant. This investment 
is particularly interesting, since it is where the participa-
tion of shareholders makes sense. At the moment, Spanish 
emf have 174 investee companies, most of them located in 
four countries: the usa (37.76%), the uk (16.57%), Spain 
(9.91%) and Germany (9.79%). These 174 companies rep-
resent our sample.
For this paper, we have chosen to use audited information 
found on each company’s website (Balance, Income State-
ment, Notes, Management Report, Audit Reports and Annual 
Report). We have studied two broad categories of variables: 
cg variables and corporate-financial information variables. 
Regarding cg, five variables have been categorized by prin-
cipal component analysis taking as starting point twenty 
items. The evaluation of the items is based on the oecd 
2004 Report in this area2. These cg variables are: a) Op-
eration of governing bodies; b) Board of Management; c) 
Support committees; d) General Meeting or similar; and e) 
Internal control systems.
The corporate-financial information variables are: 
•	 Proposed in other studies: market value (Farag, 2009; Wu 
& Wei, 1998), size (Black, Jang & Kim, 2006; Berglöf & Pa-
juste, 2005; Briano, 2012; Holder-Webb, Cohen & Wood, 
2008; Samaha et al., 2012), liability (Briano, 2012; Kirkos, 
Spathis & Manolopoulos, 2007), performance (Belkaoui 
& Pavlik, 1992; Ghafouri, 2014; Shin, 2001) and financial-
legal system (Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005). 
•	 Proposed by the authors: Organizational Structure of 
Company (osc) and Level of Accessibility to the Informa-
tion (lai). The osc item is a continuous variable (from 0 
to 1) that measures the degree of development of the 
2  The twenty items are: 1) Statutory limitations to the vote; 2) Com-
petencies of the General Meeting; 3) Prior information on proposed 
agreements; 4) Separate voting for separate matters; 5) Split voting; 
6) Powers of the Board of Management; 7) Size of Board; 8) Propor-
tion between independent and nominee directors; 9) Number of in-
dependent directors; 10) President/ceo; 11) Attendance at meetings; 
12) Prior information given to Directors; 13) Cessation/Resignation 
Policy; 14) Payments policy; 15) Gender Diversity; 16) Executive 
Committee; 17) Auditing Committee; 18) Internal Control System; 
19) Appointment Committee; and 20) Remuneration Committee.
decision and control system of the company, under-
stood as the level of participation of different stake-
holders and obtained from the Annual Report of each 
one. Thus, the osc variable measures the global struc-
ture of the firm, without discriminating between the 
possible aspects that distinguish the type of cg. The lai 
represents the degree of access to audited information 
on the companies’ websites (Likert scale 1-7).
The stated hypotheses require different techniques for 
contrast. In order to analyze the existence of different cg 
models we used cluster analysis. The test of the second 
hypothesis was carried out using the logistic regression 
model3. For the third one we used the ols regression model 
with the ls and 2sls estimators. The endogenous variable 
is Corporate Structure, the exogenous variables are the cg 
model and the instrumental variables are the other finan-
cial information variables. Data was analyzed using spss 
19.0 and Stata 14.0.
Results
Descriptive Analysis 
This section reveals a first approximation of the data. The de-
scriptive statistics of the items of the cg variables show im-
portant differences. For example, items related to split voting, 
or separate voting on separate matters, reach levels of com-
pliance greater than 90%. Nevertheless, other items, such as 
gender diversity, do not reach 25%. In addition, we can ob-
serve that, except for the anti-takeover measures (63.8%), 
items related to the Board present a degree of compliance in-
ferior to (statistical rank = 64.9%) the ones presented by the 
items of General Meeting (statistical rank = 30.5%) or Sup-
port Committees (statistical rank = 12.6%).
With regard to the financial information variables (table 1), 
we observe that firms in the portfolio of the emf are large 
3 In order to estimate the factors that affect the selection of the cg mo-
del, we have specified a binary logistic regression (logit regression). 
A logit model describes the relationship between a dichotomous de-
pendent variable that can take value 1 (cg model) or value 0, and k 
for other explanatory variables x1, x2... xk. Since the dependent varia-
ble is binary (dichotomous), it follows the Bernoulli distribution, thus 
Pj = P (yj = 1) is the probability of belonging to a cg Model and (1-Pj) 
is the probability of non-belonging. The estimated model can be ex-
pressed as:
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where Yj is the binary endogenous variable. The exogenous varia-
bles are represented by Xi, e being the random disturbance. Para-
meters  of the model are a measurement of the increase in the 
probability of belonging to a cg model. 
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-sized (mean = 25.2), with a great number of multinationals 
and a high level of solvency (mean in (Equity) = 23.8), and 
that they also tend to be efficient companies (mean in(np) = 
20.40). Among these variables, we have observed low dis-
persion (sd < 3), except in performance (sd = 5.65). The dis-
persion detected in this last variable could be caused by the 
strong geographical diversity in the sample. 
Finally, the financial-legal system variable indicates that 
36% of the companies in the sample are located in coun-
tries of the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. Furthermore, the 
firms studied reach a compliance of 75% of the practices 
suggested in the oecd Code 2004, while the quality of ac-
cess to information via the website reaches a level of 67% 
in the sample.
Do the emf’s Investee Companies 
use Different cg Models?
Cluster analysis results are shown in graph 1. In this chart we 
can see the position of the companies that make up the port-
folio of Spanish emf. The Governing Bodies’ factor is related 
to equity concentration, while the Board Composition factor 
could be identified with the stakeholder orientation.
Table 1.
Descriptive statistics of economic and financial information.
variables Measurement Mean SD Max Min
Size Ln (Asset) 25.20 2.20 32.70 15.30
Liability Ln (Liability) 24.60 2.60 32.70 10.00
Liability Ln (Equity) 23.80 2.00 30.00 15.30
Market Value Ln (Market value) 24.20 2.20 30.50 12.80
Performance Ln(Net Profit) 20.40 5.65 27.17 0.00
Financial Legal System Anglo-Saxon Law 0.36 0.48 1.00 0.00
Organizational Structure (osc) Organizational Structure 0.75 0.20 1.00 0.00
Level of Accessibility to Information (lai) Level of Accessibility to Information 0.67 0.17 0.96 0.13
Note. This table contains a description of variables and measurement criteria of each variable. It also shows the mean, standard deviation (sd), maximum (Max) and minimum (Min) values.
Source: Own elaboration.
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Graph 1. Cluster analysis results. Note. This graph shows the three groups analyzed and, in addition, includes the centroids, in order to allow a more rapid 
identification of the groups. Source: Own elaboration.
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We can observe three groups with different characteristics: 
1. Companies with the Anglo-Saxon cg model: Governing 
Bodies are found to be very developed, dealing with 
companies that respect the rights of the minority share-
holder (low equity concentration), allowing split voting 
or separate voting on separate matters.
2. Companies with the German cg model: Social Bodies 
function correctly, but the Board of Management com-
position is different because there is high stakeholders’ 
participation, especially among employees.
3. Companies with the French cg model: This third group 
comprises companies with few Governing Bodies (high 
equity concentration and poor stakeholder participa-
tion). These are companies that have statutory barriers 
(anti-takeover measures, limitation on the right to vote, 
lack of information on proposed agreements).
The origin of these companies is diverse. Countries from the 
Anglo-Saxon sphere make up the first group. usa and uk 
companies tend to position themselves together, and in the 
highest ranking. Certain companies from the Nordic coun-
tries (Norway and Sweden) are also included in this cluster, 
as well as companies from the Commonwealth, such as 
Australia and Canada. The second group is composed of 
German, Spanish, Danish and certain American companies. 
North American companies in this cluster are, in all cases, 
companies with strong roots in Europe (J&J, Coca-Cola, and 
Cisco). Finally, French, Italian, Portuguese and Japanese 
companies form the third group. 
By using non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis and median tests (ta-
ble 2), at a 5% significance level, we can see how the Gover- 
ning Bodies, Board of Management, Support Committees 
and Audit variables take on different values in each one of 
the groups analyzed. That is, there are three cg models with 
differentiated characteristics, although this conclusion co-
uld be different in matters specific to the General Meeting. 
As for Spanish Ethic Mutual Fund investees, most compa-
nies use the German model (49.43%), while the French 
model tends to remain in a lower position (13.22%). To con-
firm this conclusion, we conducted a t-test for difference 
in means. The results show a p-value = 0.000 for pairs of 
models. Therefore, emf would tend to consider the cg mod-
el when selecting their investments. Particularly, Spanish 
emf would favor the investment where an active role of the 
stakeholders in the projects of the organization is promoted.
Are the Financial Results and Corporate 
Structure Factors that Affect the Choice of 
cg Model in the Investee Companies?
In all models (table 3), the osc indicator is a critical vari-
able at a 5% significance level. That is, the items related to 
the operation of the General Meeting, Board of Manage-
ment and Support Committees explain the probability of 
belonging to a specific cg model. In addition, we can ob-
serve that the variable takes different signs in the studied 
models. The positive sign (= 0.17) is typical of the Anglo-
Saxon model, while the negative sign manifests in the rest 
of the models ( = -0.025 in the German model or  = 
-0.195 for the French model). Therefore, the unit increases 
of the osc indicator lower the probability of belonging to 
the French and German models.
The Anglo-Saxon model introduces two additional explan-
atory variables: market orientation ( = -0.296) and legal 
tradition of the country ( = -1.528). Both variables favor 
Table 2.
Non-parametric contrasts between groups.
Panel A. Kruskal-Wallis Test
Governing Bodies Board of Management Support Committees General Meeting
Audit and  
Internal Control 
Chi-squared 73.350 85.274 13.554 0.807 7.458 
Deg. of freedom 2 2 2 2 2 
Asymptotic significance 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.668 0.024 
Panel B. Median Test
Median 0.309 0.071 0.014 -0.013 0.076
Chi-squared 31.166 78.372 9.343 0.271 11.573 
Deg. of freedom 2 2 2 2 2 
Asymptotic significance 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.873 0.003 
Note. In panel A, we can observe the Kruskall-Wallis test for Governing Bodies, Board of Management, Support Committees, General Meeting and Audit and Internal Control. In panel B we observe the 
Median test for the same variables. In the first column, the statistic chi-squared, degrees of freedom and asymptotic significance are shown.
Source: Own elaboration.
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belonging to the Anglo-Saxon model (see column Exp (), 
table 3), but to a lesser extent than the osc of the company. 
The German model lists three variables of its own, which fa-
vor its choice: legal tradition ( = 1.626), liability ( = 0.402) 
and, to a smaller degree, performance ( = -0.286). We can 
observe that legal tradition is the most significant variable 
in both models, but with opposite signs. In the French mod-
el, the only significant variable is the osc ( = -0.195). 
As shown in table 4, all models achieved an appropriate 
fit in terms of R2 of Cox and Snell (R2CS) and Nagelkerke’s 
R2 (R2N).
Table 4.
Model fit.
Model R2CS R2n
Anglo-Saxon model 0.423 0.577
German model 0.237 0.316
French model 0.447 0.825
Note. This table 4 contains information about the goodness of fit of each proposed model. We have 
used two indicators: R2 of Cox and Snell and R2 of Nagelkerke.
Source: Own elaboration.
Thus, the Anglo-Saxon model would be considered a market- 
oriented model, the German would be a funding-oriented 
model and the French one would remain a specifically 
management-oriented model. As consequence, the stake-
holders’ role is different. In the Anglo-Saxon model this 
participation comes from market although it is weak, while 
in the German model the participation has its origin in the 
financial institutions. In both cases we can observe an ac-
tive role in the participation of stakeholders, which will 
be more intense in the case of German model due to its 
stakeholders are supporting the financial sustainability of 
the entity. Finally, the French model would be character-
ized by a passive role in the participation of stakeholders 
since it does no promote an external orientation. 
What are the Factors that Determine the 
Degree of Development of the Corporate 
Structure of the Investee Companies?
Table 5 shows the defining variables of cg practices within 
a company. In addition to the proposed variables, variables 
belonging to the Anglo-Saxon model and the German mod-
el have been added. 
Table 5. 
Results bilateralized cosines regression model.
Dependent 
variables
Independent variables  Sig.
OSC
 Size -1.347 0.158
Liability 2.093 0.030
Performance -2.343 0.020
LAI 0.527 0.000
Belonging Anglo-Saxon Model 31.032 0.000
Belonging German Model 22.402 0.000
Note. This table shows the results of the ols regression model. This model relates the Organizational 
Structure of Corporation (osc) with factors which determine it (size, liability, performance, level of 
accessibility to information (lai) and belonging to a particular model of cg). The parameters are 
represented by , being sig. the level of significance.
Source: Own elaboration.
As significant variables we have liability ( = 2.093), lai ( = 
0.527) and, especially, belonging to a particular model of gov-
ernment ( = 31.032, Anglo-Saxon model, and  = 22.402, 
Table 3.
Binary logistic regression coefficients.
Models variables Measurements  Exp() Sig.
Anglo-Saxon model
Intercept -6.494 0.002 0.054
osc osc 0.170 1.186 0.000
Market Orientation Ln Market Value -0.296 0.743 0.021
Legal tradition Legal tradition -1.528 0.217 0.001
German model
Intercept -7.848 0.000 0.012
osc osc -0.025 0.975 0.029
Liability Ln Equity 0.402 1.494 0.003
Performance LnNet Profit -0.286 0.751 0.015
Legal tradition Legal tradition 1.626 5.085 0.000
French model
Intercept 1.348 3.849 0.000
osc osc -0.195 0.823 0.000
Note. This table contains the logit regression for each Corporate Governance model (Anglo-Saxon model, German model and French model). In the Variables column, we can observe the variables that 
characterize the models (Organizations Structure of Corporation (osc), market orientation, legal tradition, level of liability and performance). These variables are measured by different indicators that appear 
in the next column. Finally, we can see the parameter (), exponential change Exp() and level of significance (Sig.).
Source: Own elaboration.
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German model). The positive signs of the coefficients indicate 
that companies that are more indebted develop more cg prac-
tices, offer greater accessibility to their information and follow 
a behavior proper to German model where the stakeholders’ 
participation is strengthened.
Size ( = -1.347) and performance ( = -2.343) variables 
contradict the expected results. Size is not a significant 
variable (sig = 0.158), while the coefficient associated with 
performance is negative. Consequently, the cg practices of 
more efficient firms tend to be less developed.
Regarding the goodness of fit of the model, the quadratic 
residues (F-Snedecor = 2962.929) are statistically signifi-
cant at 1% level. Therefore, the model captures the most 
important explanatory variables of the degree of develop-
ment of cg practices reached by the companies analyzed.
Finally, we tested the previous model using the 2sls esti-
mator. The results of this model confirmed previous results 
(annex 1).
Discussion
As indicated, in recent years, six cg models have been iden-
tified: Anglo-Saxon, German, French, Japanese, Emerging 
and Scandinavian (Krambia & Psaros, 2006; Jong, 1991; 
Moerland, 1995; Scott, 1985). Each model promotes a dif-
ferent tendency in the stakeholders’ participation. In this 
study, evidence shows that companies with emf invest-
ments match the characteristics of the three basic models: 
Anglo-Saxon, German and French. The Anglo-Saxon model 
is characterized by granting more protection to the mi-
nority shareholders against the power enjoyed by majority 
models are based on the dichotomy between the share-
holders/owners of the capital, and the company man-
agers. The difference is that the French model aims to 
protect the concentration of capital, while the German en-
courages an active stakeholder participation in the man-
agement bodies (Cazorla, 2012; Lopez & Liduina, 2006; 
Reynolds & Flores, 1989; Sava, 2002).
Regarding the Japanese model, Ooghe and De Langhe 
(2002), García-Castro et al. (2008) and Briano (2012) con-
sider it is not a model of its own, since the companies that 
apply it essentially follow the guidelines of the French mod-
el. We share the view of these authors, since cluster analy-
sis results show that the Japanese firms in the sample follow 
the French model. Referring to the Emerging and Scandina-
vian models, Weimer and Pape (1999) argue these are varia-
tions of the Anglo-Saxon, German and French models. 
The use of binary logistic regressions allowed us to reveal 
the factors that explain the probability of belonging to the 
proposed models. Thus, market value, organizational struc-
ture and the Common Law legal system explain the be-
longing to the Anglo-Saxon model where the stakeholders’ 
participation is favored. On the contrary, the German mod-
el is based on variables related to financial and economic 
results, as well as the organizational structure and the sys-
tem of Roman civil law, whereas the French model would be 
more focused on the organizational structure of the compa-
ny. So the second working hypothesis is not rejected; that 
is, organizational structure and financial results are factors 
that determine the belonging to a particular model in addi-
tion to other components, such as legal tradition, proposed 
in previous studies (De Andrés & Santamaría, 2010; Salas, 
2002). Moreover, we identify that the Anglo-Saxon and 
German models favor the participation of different stake-
holders. The German model is centered in the financial insti-
tutions, while the Anglo-Saxon model takes a broader point 
of view.
In the contrast of the second hypothesis, the organizational 
structure appears as a determining factor in the choice of 
the cg model. However, previous studies have shown the 
possible existence of an inverse relationship (Coffee, 2000; 
Johnson et al., 2000). The results of our study show a two-
way relationship and, ultimately, the financial and economic 
results and the accessibility to the information are the fac-
tors that explain both the organizational structure and the 
cg model chosen. Thus, our results disagree with authors 
who claim that the organizational structure predetermines 
the choice of model and those who suggest that the cg 
model predetermines the organizational structure chosen.
Also, unlike previous studies (Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005; Briano, 
2012; Samaha et al., 2012), size is an insignificant variable 
in determining corporate structure. Furthermore, in relation 
to the performance variable, we observe a negative effect 
on the organizational structure, which confirms the approach 
by Cabeza and Gómez (2007). We agree with these authors 
that an overly-developed corporate structure may be caus-
ing undesirable changes in the performance of the company. 
This circumstance could be justified by the existence of high 
costs associated with Support Committees formation (Girál-
dez & Hurtado, 2014). 
Finally, if we combine our working hypothesis we obtain the 
next conclusion. Spanish emf tend to fund companies that 
promote a German model of Corporate Governance. This 
model stimulates the participation of financial stakehold-
ers. Then, as consequence, Spanish emf invests in companies 
that promote an active participation of the stakeholders 
where the emf will assume its role as a financial stakeholder.
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Conclusions
The main objective of this paper has been to analyze the 
intrinsic characteristics of the companies receiving finan-
cial investment from Spanish emf based on the informa-
tion published by these companies. Results show how 
Spanish emf invest in companies with different cg models, 
being the organizations under the German model the fa-
vorite, followed by those under the Anglo-Saxon model. 
The French model is clearly a minor choice among Spanish 
emf managers. The German and Anglo-Saxon models tend 
to protect the interests of a wide range of stakeholders; 
minority shareholders, employees, creditors and other so-
cial stakeholders.
Each model is characterized by different aspects. The 
German model integrates employees, creditors and so-
cial stakeholders within its management bodies. The main 
reason for this integration can be found in the cultural 
values contained in its legal tradition, which permeate the 
organizational structure of investee companies. The Anglo-
Saxon model is also influenced by the legal tradition, but 
with a higher interest in the protection of minority share-
holders’ interests. Consequently, Spanish emf tend to make 
up their portfolios with companies that promote the inte-
gration of stakeholders in the organization and safeguard 
the minority shareholder.
Moreover, the analysis suggests that corporate results, 
cg model and accessibility to the information are the as-
pects that underlie and explain the organizational struc-
ture of companies. This result generalizes the conclusions 
suggested by Kelton and Yang (2008) on the relationship 
between organizational structure and accessibility to ac-
counting information via the Internet.
Spanish emf perceive a company as socially responsible, 
with the best cg practices, if it provides greater accessi-
bility to its information. Moreover, Spanish emf managers 
do not prefer to have participation in more efficient com-
panies. In fact, one can observe how the more efficient 
the company is, the smaller its need to invest in improving 
the standard of good cg. Therefore, we believe that the 
degree of development of organizational structure and the 
investee’s cg model will be conditioned by their financial 
needs. Thus, csr and good cg practices are essential tools 
for attracting funding and guaranteeing the sustainability 
of the company.
However, this last statement must be ascertained. Among 
the investee companies we found different ways of under-
standing csr and good cg: those where good cg and csr are 
part of corporate culture, compared to the ones replicating 
this behavior out of strategic necessity. An emf may not be 
able to distinguish between the two types of companies. A 
future line of work should focus on the development of cri-
teria that help emf to distinguish between both behaviors. 
It would also be necessary, in future research studies, to 
analyze the level of efficiency of the stock market in rela-
tion to the value of csr policies implemented by companies 
that claim to be socially responsible.
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Annex 1. Results of Bilateralized Cosines Regression Model. Estimator 2sls.1
Dependent variables Independent variables  Sig.
OSC
Size -1.357 0.200
Liability 1.929 0.068
lai 0.380 0.010
Belonging Anglo-Saxon Model 47.785 0.000
Belonging German Model 37.047 0.000
Note. This table shows the result of the ols regression model under 2sls estimator. This model relates the Organizational Structure of Corporation (osc) with factors which determine it (Size, liability, level 
of accessibility of information (lai) and belonging to a particular model of cg. Size, liability and lai have been considered independent variables, while belonging to a particular model of cg has been 
instrumentalized taken into account the previous logit regression. The parameters are represented by , being sig. the level of significant.
Endogenity test: 2(2): 2.388; p-value: 0.303, Sargan test: 2(2): 0.432; p-value: 0.8058.

